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Abstract—Operating in the ISM band, the wireless sensor 
network (WSN) risks being interfered by other concurrent 
networks. Our concerns are the technologies that do not perform 
listening before transmission such as Bluetooth, and the ones that 
do not detect other technologies due to their channel sensing 
techniques like WIFI. To overcome this issue a WSN node should 
be able to identify the presence of such technologies. This will 
allow deducing the characteristics of the generated traffic of 
these technologies, and thus the behavior of the channel can be 
predicted. These predictions would help to trigger adequate 
reactions as to avoid or synchronize with the concurrent net-
works. Many works exist on link adaptation, but they concern 
blind adaptations which are unintelligent and solve momentarily 
the problem that may reappear over time. 
In this paper, we perform several experiments on a real testbed 
to categorize the model of the bit errors in corrupted received 
packets. These experiments are performed under different 
conditions of channel noise and interferences. This allows us to 
identify each corruption pattern as a fingerprint for the 
interfering technology. Then we propose the mechanism FIM to 
identify on the fly the source of the corruption. With an 
implementation on “Tmote Sky” motes using Tinyos1.x, We 
demonstrate the use of FIM for link adaptation in a coexistence 
environment. Our mechanism led to throughput improvements of 
87%-100% depending on the transmission rate and channel 
quality.  
Keywords-Coexistence; Collision fingerprint; Coexistence 
detection; Link adaptation; Error patterns. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
IEEE 802.15.4 used by Zigbee and WSNs represents one of 
the most used and deployed network types in the industrial and 
medical environments. In this paper, Zigbee and WSN 
implicitly refer to IEEE802.15.4. These WSNs share the 2.4 
GHz industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) band with other 
technologies like Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11b/g (WLANs). Due 
to the coexistence at the same ISM band, without any radio 
planning, the interference on the WSN by these technologies is 
inevitable. This is a key issue since WSNs are very sensitive to 
the environment (cf. [1]) and they often use network 
performance measurements to feed configuration algorithms. 
The goal of this paper is to design an adaptive mechanism 
allowing the WSN nodes to dynamically recognize the 
presence of alternative technologies and to adapt their 
transmission modes accordingly.  
The source of this coexistence vulnerability is the 
heterogeneity of the physical and of the MAC mechanisms that 
leads to collisions or interferences.  The coexistence with WiFi 
has a big effect on the WSN performance, especially on 
collision avoidance and fairness between both protocols. This 
effect is primarily characterized by the WiFi and Zigbee 
transmission (Tx) rates. In contrast, our work and also [2] show 
that Bluetooth interference, thanks to its frequency hopping 
nature, has a smaller effect on the WSN. The smaller 
percentage of packet loss comes from the fact that Bluetooth 
does not use channel sensing mechanism but instead employs 
FH/TDD for channel access. 
Due to its low power and low bit rate, the WSN is mostly 
affected by the technologies that have transmission powers and 
medium sensing thresholds higher than its own. The most 
common MAC layer protocol used in these wireless 
communications is the CSMA/CA. When it was first 
developed, the diversity of the technologies such as 
IEEE802.11 and IEEE802.15.4 did not exist. By adapting the 
CSMA/CA to these technologies, modifications have been 
introduced on its sensitivity thresholds, Tx rates, etc. This led, 
in a coexistence environment, to the loss of the fairness and 
collision avoidance initially provided in CSMA/CA.  
The deficiency cause in CSMA/CA is the clear channel 
assessment (CCA) techniques. The different types of existing 
channel sensing methods are (cf. [3]): the Energy Detection 
(ED), Preamble Detection (PD) and Decorrelation-Based CCA 
(DB). Alternative spectrum sensing methods used in cognitive 
radio including multitaper spectral estimation, wavelet 
transform based estimation, Hough transform, and time-
frequency analysis cannot be applied in IEEE802.15.4 due to 
limitations in executing complex calculations and to energy 
constraints. PD cannot be used by IEEE802.15.4 to detect 
IEEE802.11 transmission because of the energy cost and 
processing complications (the need of high sampling rate, 
filtering, etc). DB is a combination of ED and PD, which 
inherits by that the same limitations. ED is not very efficient in 
case there are wideband signals, the transmission power being 
near the noise threshold with the spectrum spreading technique 
(cf. [3]) and therefore it is difficult to detect the transmission.  
Moreover, depending on the used channels, the ZigBee channel 
may overlap the WiFi one. The ZigBee channel is 2MHz wide 
(cf. Section 3) and the WiFi one is 22MHz [2]. Because of the 
smaller emission power used by ZigBee and an averaging of 
the energy received over the WiFi 22Mhz bandwidth, a WiFi 
device cannot always detect a ZigBee transmission.  
The inadequacy of CSMA/CA in heterogeneous 
environment and the inability to determine the cause of 
corruptions lead the link layer protocols designed for WSN to 
react blindly to a corrupted packet. Not knowing the nature of 
the concurrent network leads to the excessive channel power 
sampling to exploit white spaces that occur when there is 
coexistence with other technologies. To better exploit and 
predict white spaces in a channel, it is necessary to determine 
the technology that occupies the channel, and based on its 
characteristics white spaces can be exploited. 
If the coexistence cannot be avoided, corrupted packets are 
necessarily received and the network must adapt intelligently. 
The link adaptation can exist on the routing level by changing 
the network model or on the MAC and physical layer by 
changing the transmission power, channel, rate, adding 
redundant bits, etc. In a self organized network where the 
energy is a limited resource, analyzing the quality and stability 
of the channel is an energy and throughput costly process. We 
claim that the exact cause of the packet error can be inferred by 
simply analyzing the errors in the received packets and then the 
best countermeasure can be chosen. Since packet corruptions 
are unavoidable, and if a repetition mechanism like A.R.Q. is 
used, the correct packet is finally received. Then, instead of 
ignoring the previously received corrupted packet occurrences, 
we suggest to get them, to compare them with the finally 
received correct packet in order to detect the shape of the error 
sequences and to use this information to infer the cause of the 
errors.  Each cause should produce a different fingerprint. 
Knowing the cause of the erroneous packets can help to 
take adequate decisions at the link layer. By identifying a WiFi 
fingerprint in the corrupted bytes of the Zigbee packets, a 
channel swap can be made. If Bluetooth is detected, smaller 
packet lengths can be used. In case of weak link detection, 
redundant bits or FEC can be applied. If hidden terminal are 
recognized, RTS/CTS or resynchronization (if the network uses 
TDMA) must be applied. Decisions can also be taken at the 
routing layer. For clustered network, the cluster head selection 
may be based on its surrounding technologies and their effect 
on its communication. When a tree based topology is built, the 
nodes under permanent interferences with a different 
technology may be chosen as leaf nodes. In ad-hoc TDMA 
based network, the time slot that is interfered by other 
technologies may be black listed. 
In this paper, we develop this idea from experimentations 
made using off-the-shelf sensor devices. Our main 
contributions are: 1) an empirical study on byte error patterns 
for different error causes, 2) the identification of the error 
patterns as fingerprints to specific technologies, 3) the proposal 
of a new mechanism, Fingerprint Identification Mechanism 
(FIM) as a light weight and energy efficient mechanism to 
identify on the fly the coexisting technologies based on their 
fingerprints, its application for a link adaptation mechanism 
and, finally,4) the implementation and evaluation of FIM on a 
real WSN testbed. Our work is useful for a lot of applications. 
Specifically in the applications that need a high packet 
transmission rate used in intrusion detection, cold chain 
monitoring and health monitoring.  
In the next part the related work is discussed, then the 
analysis carried to identify the different byte error patterns in 
different contexts are presented. The last part is dedicated to 
the fingerprint identification mechanism, its reactions to error 
situations and finally its performance evaluation. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Different protocols have been developed to adapt the 
IEEE802.15.4 nodes in case of coexistence with networks 
using other technologies. Most of these protocols are focused 
on WiFi because of its high impact on the Zigbee performance. 
Their deficiency is that each protocol is not developed to detect 
the coexistence but they assume that a Zigbee network is 
coexisting with WiFi, and then they try to adapt ZigBee 
accordingly. For example, the CCA threshold of Zigbee is 
adjusted to minimize the packet loss in [4] and [5]. Others 
modify the packet length based on a WiFi white space model 
as in [6]. 
Work determining a coexistence case has been based on 
power (RSSI) sampling. In [7], energy detection spectrum 
sensing to select best channel in the presence of WiFi and 
Bluetooth is proposed. The power spectrum density of WiFi 
and Bluetooth is analyzed by using a sensor. In [8], RSSI 
sampling is used to detect the periodic beacons of WiFi. 
However, these solutions based on power sampling suffer from 
at least one of the following issues. 1) They are based on 
detecting the power of the physical channel and thus the Zigbee 
transmission power occupying the channel cannot be 
differentiated from WiFi or Bluetooth transmission power. 2) 
A high sampling rate is needed to detect WiFi packets, at least 
two times higher than the duration of a packet, which requires a 
high energy cost and long processing times in Zigbee nodes. 3) 
These approaches need a dedicated time to do the sampling and 
to converge. 
To our knowledge, none of the work dealing with 
coexistence adaptation or detection is based on the captured 
corrupted packets.  
III. EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENTS AND ERROR PATTERN 
IDENTIFICATION 
1) Used equipments and topology 
The aim of the experiments is to characterize the statistical 
corruption patterns in a Zigbee packet, relatively to each 
coexisting technology. Our testbed consists of 802.15.4-
compliant Tmote-Sky motes equipped with Chipcon CC2420 
transceiver [11], in presence of an interfering signal 
originating from: 
a. Intel ® pro/wireless LAN 2100 3A Mini PCI adapter 
and intel ® WIFI link 5100 AGN (WIFI cards 
integrated to DELL laptops). 
b. The built-in Bluetooth of Dell latitude (the receiver) 
and the Bluetooth of NOKIA E51 (the transmitter) 
allowing to send a long video file at the rate of 
2.1Mbps. The Bluetooth transmitter uses TDM and 
FHSS, 79 channels each one being 1MHz wide. There 
are 1600 hops per second (hps), the time slot is thus 
625µs. Then the equivalent rate transmitted by 
Bluetooth on a 2MHz wide ZigBee channel is 
2MHz/(79x1MHz)x2.1Mbps=53kbps. 
To monitor the channel characteristics during the tests, to 
tune and select the overlapping channels between WiFi and 
Zigbee, we used the BK PRECISION by MICRONIX 
(8.5GHz) 2658 spectrum analyzer. We specifically used the 
channel 1 for WiFi and the channels 11, 13 and 14 for Zigbee. 
The Tx power of Zigbee was set to -7dBm (PA_LEVEL=15). 
Operating in the 2.4GHz band IEEE802.15.4 forced the 
use WIFI versions IEEE802.11b/g. Moreover, between the 
IEEE802.11b and IEEE802.11g, there is an important aspect 
to be taken which is that the IEEE802.11g uses the OFDM 
modulation that applies low CCA threshold. This fact allows 
the IEEE802.11g to detect the presence of IEEE802.15.4 
transmissions and apply back-off. In contrast, IEEE802.11b 
uses DSSS (high Tx power) therefore it uses higher 
thresholds. As we are dealing with packet corruption due to 
hidden terminal effect and not congestion, this study is 
focused on IEEE802.11b. 
To speed up the convergence, we submitted the equipment 
to extreme conditions and very high Tx rates. For these 
experiments, we used Tinyos 1.x to modify the TOSBASE 
application to receive and analyze packets. In order to receive 
erroneous packets, we deactivated the CRC check and the 
hardware acknowledgments generated by the CC2420 [11]. To 
have a high collision rate and consequently a fast convergence 
rate, we disabled the CCA and backoff (they are reactivated 
later for the FIM validation) and we set the appropriate 
channels and power to be used. We used the APIs developed 
in [9] to generate a customized WiFi traffic. To monitor the 
WiFi traffic (control and Data packets), we used Wireshark. 
The collision analysis is done on a fixed Zigbee packet length 
of 122bytes for all experiments. 
2) Measurement Results  
    In this part, collisions are generated to determine the 
technology fingerprints. The measured quantity is the 
distribution of the number of erroneous bytes in a received 
packet. We run the experiments within 5 scenarios 
corresponding to the most typical contexts of errors. In all the 
experiments, the influence of the packet rates, packet sizes and 
channel numbers is observed. When collisions occur, the 
Zigbee packet we analyze is (a) not received or (b) it is 
received with an error or (c) it is received correctly. The case 
(a) occurs when the collision corrupts the synchronization 
header (SHR) and the Frame length. During all the tests, we 
directly dropped the packets with corrupted length because it 
causes the applications to malfunction. The scenarios are:   
 The case of Weak SNR for ZigBee Tx 
Long distances and low Tx powers create weak links. We 
ran an experiment with a low emission power. For the weak 
SNR test represented in Figure 1, 105849 packets were 
transmitted of which 18% suffered from corruption. The 
transmitters and the receivers were placed in different rooms 
separated by a distance of 5 meters. To achieve solid results, 
the experiments involved all the channels. Due to the lack of 
space and future need we only show the results of the channels 
11, 13 & 14. For all the channels, we obtained similar results. 
These channels being theoretically quasi-orthogonal, there is 
practically no interference between adjacent nodes using co-
channels and the same power for packet transmission: each 
traffic experiences no collision. Special measures have been 
taken to ensure that no interfering transmitters were present, 
thus avoiding the possibility of packet losses due to collisions.  
Figure 1 shows the density function of the corruption 
length in bytes of the Zigbee packets. The Zigbee packet 
length is 122 bytes. The density is always decreasing with the 
number of erroneous bytes. The observed density does not 
correspond to a geometrical distribution, which would be 
expected since the errors are expected to be independent. In 
fact, the errors in the sequence of the transmitted bits are 
independent but since spectrum spreading is used, when the 
received bit flow is de-spread, errors are cancelled (which is 
the reason why the spectrum spreading is efficient in low 
signal to noise plus interferences situations) resulting in a non 
exponential error distribution. 
In this scenario, one ZigBee transmitter sends traffic to its 
receiver while another ZigBee transmitter sends traffic to 
another one, both couples interfering together. One sender 
uses 122 byte packets. We varied the size of the packet sent by 
the other concurrent ZigBee sender (cf. Figure 2, Figure 3, 
Figure 4 and Figure 5). The Figure 2 represents the case where 
a couple communicates with packets of length 122 bytes while 
the other couple communicates with a packet length of 16 
bytes. A peak is reached at 11 bytes with a density of 0.3. The 
Figure 3 represents the collision between 122 byte packets 
with 90 byte packets. A peak appears at 85 bytes with a 
density of 0.22. In the case of the Figure 4 all packets have an 
equal 122 byte length. Two peaks appear, at 1 byte and at 106 
bytes. The Figure 5 represents collisions between 122 byte 
packets and packets of length 12 bytes. 
A common feature between all these cases is the difference 
of 5 bytes between a packet and its collision effect on the 122 
bytes packet. It is due to the fact that 5 is the length of the 
physical layer header. It is less clear in the case of collisions 
between 122 bytes packets and 12 bytes packets (cf. Figure 5). 
On Figure 4, the peak is at 106 bytes which is equal to 122-
12(ZigBee header length)-4. The other peak at 1 byte is due to 
the big length of the packet and the Tx scheduling deviation 
which is related to the default swap between Tx and reception 
that exists in the CC2420 radio, the result is a collision with a 
small portion or a big portion of the packet. In the 122bytes 
long packets corruptions, the header size should be subtracted 
because the packets for which the header is corrupted are not 
received and taken in the analysis. In the case of the 122B 
vs.12B collision, due to the difficulty to have collision the 
 
Figure 1: Empirical frequency of the  error length for the weak link  
 ZigBee interference (Hidden terminal) 
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Number of erroneous byte per packet 
Weak link 
dominating effect is a combination between noise and weak 
link effect.  
 
Figure 2: 122B vs. 16B packets 
 
     Figure 3: 122B vs. 90B packets 
 
Figure 4: 122B vs. 122B packets 
 
Figure 5: 122B vs. 12B packets 
 ZigBee with BlueTooth 
The next scenario (cf. Figure 6 to Figure 7) is intended to 
observe the Bluetooth fingerprint. During the test 68006 
packets were transmitted of which 2531 packets were lost. The 
ZigBee rate and used channel are varied. For clarity and space 
purposes we only show the highest and lowest Zigbee Tx rates 
12.5 packets per seconds (pps) and 166 pps. As it was 
expected, the coexistence with Bluetooth has a low effect on 
the Zigbee traffic. Less than 4% of the packets are lost due to 
collisions with Bluetooth. More precisely most of the lost 
packets were lost at the connection establishment between the 
Bluetooth devices (in this case the FH rate becomes 3200 hps).  
Bluetooth has the same effect on the 3 channels and for the 
various rates used by Zigbee. The cause of the resemblance 
between the 3 channels is due to the frequency hopping 
performed by Bluetooth. 
 
Figure 6: Zigbee colliding with BlueTooth, with a ZigBee Tx rate 12.5pps 
Bluetooth is compared to the weak link case in Figure 8. In 
the Bluetooth graph most of the corruptions have densities less 
than 0.08, the same as the densities of corruption bigger than 4 
bytes in the weak Link. The key differences are first the high 
density of the “one byte corruption” relatively to the other 
corruptions lengths in the weak SNR graph and second the 
fact that, at the tail of the Bluetooth density graph, there are 
higher densities that appear for the corruptions with big 
lengths, located between 80 bytes and 90 bytes, which are 
linear and flat in the case of the weak link.  
Figure 7: ZigBee colliding with O 
BlueTooth, ( Zigbee Tx rate 166pps) 
O Figure 8: BlueTooth and weak 
link patterns(for comparison) 
 ZigBee with WiFi 
We should emphasize that the transmission rates used in 
the experiments of WIFI coexistence are based on real 
scenarios. In the first scenario, the downlink interference in 
the areas covered by the WIFI AP is much higher than uplink 
interference of the mobile WIFI nodes; the uplink is used for 
small request messages, in contrast the downlink generates a 
high aggregated traffic of different types and for different 
mobile nodes. In the second scenario, what will affect the 
sensor is the sum of all the traffic generated by that AP which 
will be very high if there were a high number of mobile nodes 
or big files transfer.  
First we observe the effect of the control traffic only on 
different channels. The results are shown on the Figure 9, 
Figure 10 and the Figure 11. The overlap of a WiFi channel 
with Zigbee channels (cf. Figure 15) has various effects on 
ZigBee depending on the deviation from the center frequency 
of the WiFi channel. We varied the used channel but we only 
show the results of the WiFi channel 1 overlapped with the 
Zigbee channels 11, 13 and 14. The results can be extended to 
the other cases like the one with the WiFi channel number 1 
together with the Zigbee channel 11 (similar to the effect of 
WiFi channel 7 on the Zigbee channel 17). On the Figure 9 
and Figure 11, there are peaks at 26 and 27 bytes respectively. 
These peaks are caused by the collisions between ZigBee and 
the WiFi control packets (beacons, requests, etc.). 
On Figure 10 the effect of WiFi is more resembling to the 
weak link case. This is due to the energy distribution of the 
WiFi traffic which is not uniform over its spectrum but more 
important on the left of the WiFi spectrum (cf. [10]). The used 
Zigbee Tx rate is 33 pps. During all the tests we did not 
modify the default control message Tx rate and length. For the 
channel 11, 51182 Zigbee packets are sent, 7% are lost. For 
the channel 13, 26444 packets are sent, 18% are lost. For the 
channel 14, 26167 packets are sent, 6% are lost. 
Then, the WiFi data traffic is added (cf. Figure 12, Figure 
13 and Figure 14). The data Tx rate is 916 pps with a 1500 
byte packet length, the Zigbee rate is 166pps with a 122 byte 
packet length. On the channel 11, 51200 packets were 
transmitted and 6% were lost. On the channel 13, 51049 
packets were sent and 18% were lost. On the channel 14, 
51182 packets were sent and 0.7% were lost. The effect of the 
WiFi packets on the channel 11 is less than on the channel 13 
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
 
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
 
Number of erroneous bytes per packet Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
per packet 
 
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
  
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
per packet 
 
 
Number of erroneous bytes per packet  
 
 
 
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
   
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
 
 
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
   
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
  
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
  
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
due to its higher deviation from the WiFi center frequency. On 
the channel 13, there are two main peaks at 27 bytes and at 4 
bytes, on the channel 11 there are similar peaks but the first 
one at a smaller value.  
 
Figure 9 WiFi control traffic pattern, 
channel 11 
 
Figure 10 WiFi control traffic pattern, 
channel 14 
 
Figure 11 WiFi control traffic 
pattern, channel 13 
 
Figure 12: WiFi control and data 
traffic pattern, channel 11 
 
Figure 13: WiFi control and 
data traffic pattern, channel 13 
 
Figure 14: WiFi control and data 
traffic pattern, channel 14 
The case of the channel 14 has the form of weak link case 
for the same reason as in Figure 10. The cause of the low 
packet loss percentage is that as the control packets use 
different modulation from the data packets it creates higher 
interferences on most of the wifi channel band, specifically the 
higher edge of the band where channel 14 of the Zigbee is 
located. At the same time the control packets use basic rate 
which implies that the channel occupation of these packets 
takes longer time than the data packets, this gives higher 
probability for collisions with Zigbee packets. During the 
experiment when we added data traffic to the control packets, 
this caused the transmitter to send less control packets on the 
expense of the data traffic. With less control packets sent less 
collisions happens. Therefore the dominant effect becomes 
more or less the weak link effect. 
Finally, the WiFi has a fingerprint with a shape of a horse 
saddle. The first peak is related to corruptions caused by the 
data packets. The data packets cause short corruption bursts 
because of the high WiFi data bitrate and the fact that the 
ZigBee channels intersect only a small part of the WiFi one. 
The second peak is related to the control packets which use the 
basic rate which is different (2Mbps, cf. [10]) from the bit rate 
used by the data packets. 
There is a small probability to have the case of overlapping 
APs that uses the same channels. Therefore its effect will be 
minimal on the fingerprint. Usually if there was adjacent APs 
they will use different channels to avoid inter cell interference. 
This act will cause the Zigbee to just interfere with one AP. As 
a result the fingerprint will not be affected.  
 
Depending on the data traffic rate, the weight of each peak 
is different (cf. Figure 16), but the pattern does not change. 
The effect of the control packets (peak at 26-27bytes) is 
observed on the channels 11 and 13 but not clear on the ch 14.  
 
Figure 16: Wifi control and data traffic pattern, effect of the data rate 
Experimentations with different WiFi packet lengths show 
that below a certain threshold packet length, equal to L=1100 
bytes, the data peak disappears. In an experiment with a WiFi 
back to back packet transmission  (1250 pps), the WiFi data 
traffic with 1100 byte length packets is  still detectable (cf. 
Figure 17) but when a packet length of l=1000bytes, for 
example, is used, only the peak corresponding to the control 
traffic remains (cf. Figure 18). We do not represent the 
channel 14 in Figure 18 because we had only 0.2% packets 
lost over 39634 packets sent. For the channel 11, 1.5% packets 
are corrupted out of 38488 packets sent. For the channel 13, 
there are 19% corrupted packets out of 38672 packets. 
 
Figure 17: Wifi control and data traffic pattern, effect of the large packets  
Figure 15: the red rectangular zone represents the experiment’s channels used 
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
    
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
    
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
 
 
 
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
 
 
 
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
 
 
 
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
 
 
 
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
     
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
     
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
 
 
 
 
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
     
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
     
Channel 11 
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
      
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
      
Number of erroneous bytes per packet 
 
 
 
 
 
Threshold Length for Detecting Data Packet (1100B) 
 
 
Figure 18: Wifi control and data traffic pattern, effect of small packets  
 ZigBee with a mix of concurrent networks 
In a last experiment, we mixed different types of 
concurrent technologies at the same time. We used a WiFi 
transmitter sending back-to-back 1400 byte long data packets 
to a receiver with, on the channel 11, two ZigBee transmitters 
sending traffic to a receiver, a ZigBee transmitter sending 
traffic to a receiver on the channel 13 and another ZigBee 
transmitter sending traffic to a receiver on the channel 14. 
 
Figure 19: A mix of concurrent networks observed in channel 11 
 
Figure 20: ZigBee with a mix of 
concurrent networks, channel 14 
 
Figure 21: ZigBee with a mix of 
concurrent networks, channel 13 
On the channel 11, a ZigBee node sends 122 byte long 
packets and the other 90 byte packets. The results are shown 
Figure 19, Figure 20, and Figure 21. The distinction between 
these technologies is clear. On Figure 19 representing the 
channel 11 the three peaks appear. The first peak, between 2 
and 6 bytes, is due to the WiFi data packet. The second peak is 
due to the WiFi control packets and the last one at 85 bytes 
corresponds to the Zigbee packets. The zigbee channels being 
quasi-orthogonal, no zigbee effect is observed on the channels 
13 and 14 (Figure 21, Figure 20 respectively). The wifi effect 
appears clearly on the channels 11 and 13.  
Overlapping areas between APs can exist which gives the 
impression that the error patterns can be affected. In reality 
these areas are undesirable and are aimed to be small. In an 
industrial environment they prevent such interference by 
assigning different channels to each adjacent AP. The impact 
on the sensors is that it will only be interfered by one AP most 
of the time. Therefore the fingerprint of the WIFI should stay 
applicable most of the time in the area covered by the AP even 
if there were multiple WIFI mobile nodes. Furthermore if 
there were different types of traffic, the sensor will be affected 
mostly by the longest burst of data and by the length of the 
packets as it was shown in the experiments. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Although in reality it makes sense that one can imagine a 
high number of error patterns due to the chaotic nature of the 
interference. We aim to detect specific technologies of 
interest. The fact is that each technology uses specific 
components: type of modulation, Tx power and scheduling 
mechanism. For each component specific BER is 
demonstrated in the literature. This suggests that the 
combination of such component in a specific technology will 
create a unique combination of BER. This is shown in the 
experiments and presented as error patterns in a received 
packet. Moreover the experiments showed that due to the use 
of a number of packet not just one sample, the patterns 
converge to the dominating interferer fingerprint.  
The remarkable point is that the case of coexistence will 
always be detected even if the concurrent technology has a 
small overlapped portion of the ZigBee spectrum, or small 
duration of occupying the spectrum or low power. It is 
deduced from the experiments (cf. figure 5, 6, 7, 10, 14 and 
20). In all of these figures a dominant peak at the one byte 
along with a wide base that represents the high error density at 
high error lengths that reaches 20 bytes is shown. This is what 
represents a distinction from the weak link effect. Although in 
this case we cannot identify a specific technology but we can 
be sure that the node is in the case of coexistence and the node 
should react accordingly. 
V. FIM AND ITS APPLICATION TO LINK ADAPTATION 
From the above results, we designed a Fingerprint 
Identification Mechanism, FIM, allowing to recognize on the 
fly the technology used in the concurrent network. Our 
observations showed that the ability to determine the cause of 
packet corruptions from the number of erroneous bytes is 
highly accurate and simple. There is no need to use 
sophisticated costly methods for the detection. Each corrupted 
packet is stored in a queue (in push out mode because of the 
limited memory) and a negative acknowledgment is sent. Each 
time a correct packet (correct CRC) is received a search for 
the packets with the same ID and the sequence number is done 
in the queue. Then the number of erroneous bytes in the 
corrupted packets is calculated and an empirical frequency of 
the number of erroneous bytes is updated. Then a comparison 
is triggered to detect peaks at certain error length. When a 
fingerprint is detected, an action is triggered. Otherwise if 
there was an ambiguity in the pattern, FIM would not react. 
To demonstrate the efficiency of our proposal, we 
implemented FIM with a simple CSMA/CA (we reactivated 
the disabled feature; the CCA, backoff, etc.), in a coexistence 
environment with WiFi. Two scenarios have been studied: 
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without and then with FIM to detect WiFi. In this last 
scenario, a WiFi detection triggers a channel swap from the 
channel 11 to the channel 15 in order to avoid the WiFi. This 
approach is only to serve as a prototype implementation of 
FIM and is by no means an optimal algorithm.  
The aim of this scenario is to demonstrate how FIM can be 
effective in making more intelligent decisions to optimize a 
link quality in a self organized manner. We made two 
experiments, one with a data transmission rates used by WiFi 
equal to 458 pps and for the other the rate is 916 pps, the 
packet length being always 1500 bytes. The Zigbee data rate is 
33pps. During these experiments we used typical traffic rates 
for scenario like intrusion detection, cold chain monitoring or 
health monitoring, along to the scenario where a node is a 
critical node (bottleneck): cluster head or a relay node. The 
presence of such nodes is critical to create bridges between the 
clusters and the parts of a network. The links connecting such 
critical nodes usually generate a high traffic that aggregates 
different traffics passing through to the different parts of the 
network. If these nodes are lost the connectivity among the 
network nodes is lost. The rates in these circumstances can 
exceed 50 pps in case of an alert activation or for continuous 
surveillance.  
After 105 collisions for 458 pps and 20 collisions for 916 
pps the WiFi is detected. The Figure 23 shows the throughput 
change through time for the case 458 pps. At the link 
adaptation activation, that is to say at 173s, the change can be 
observed from 18 pps to 28 pps. On Figure 22, the average 
global improvement in throughput is shown. For a WiFi Tx 
rate of 458pps the gain is equal to 87%, and for 916 it is 
100.9%. FIM is designed for fingerprint detection. It also 
indirectly gives an indicator of the effectiveness of the 
countermeasures used against the concurrent technologies. 
The more the countermeasure is effective the less erroneous 
bytes there should be and thus the less a concurrent 
technology is detected. Moreover, the efficiency of FIM 
increases with the collisions. If there are few collisions, it 
converges slowly, but in this case the problem of the collisions 
is less crucial: if the effect of the coexisting technologies is 
minimal or there is no effect there is no need to adapt. 
 
Figure 22: throughput with and 
without FIM for link adaptation 
 
Figure 23: ZigBee throughput at the 
detection instant for a WiFi rate of 
458pps and a Zigbee rate of 33.3pps 
VI. CONCLUTION 
The diversity of technologies that coexist in the same ISM 
band as WSN, varies from technologies that do not perform 
listening before transmission like Bluetooth, to the ones that, 
due to their CCA specifications, do not detect other 
technologies like WIFI. Due to the lack of coordination 
between these technologies, the WSN needs to detect the 
presence of each one. Thus a specific countermeasure can be 
applied to avoid collisions with these technologies. 
In this paper, we identified different fingerprints of various 
coexisting technologies based on the IEEE802.15.4 packet 
corruption patterns. We considered ZigBee, BlueTooth and 
WiFi concurrent traffics, each one producing a specific 
corruption pattern. Moreover the weak link corruption model 
is also identified. Then, we designed FIM, a reactive 
mechanism to detect on the fly these fingerprints. On our 
“Tmote Sky” testbed, in some cases FIM provides up to 100% 
accuracy in detecting the correct fingerprint. During some of 
the experiments, its implementation for link adaptation 
improved the throughput by 100.9%.  
This preliminary work is to serve as a proof of concept. 
We performed first experiments which must be extended to 
other technologies and configurations, like with WiFi access 
points rather than in ad-hoc mode, using OFDM instead of 
DSSS, etc. The impact of the node mobility on the error 
shapes is also an interesting subject. In this paper we only give 
an implementation example of adaptation mechanism after 
WiFi detection to illustrate the efficiency and usefulness of 
our link adaptation mechanism. A lot of other adaptation 
mechanisms can be designed and optimized and for various 
other technologies.  
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